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Abstract: 
 
This article looks at the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in the context of UK 
devolution and how these have been affected by the more widespread occurrence of party 
incongruence since 2007. As predicted by the hypotheses in the introduction to this special 
issue, we first show how the asymmetric design of devolution is conducive to bilateral and 
weakly institutionalized intergovernmental relations, and how the asymmetric design of UK 
devolution has been perpetuated since devolution was implemented in 1999. Yet, although 
devolution (unlike federalism) implies a constitutional hierarchy between levels, in the 
second part of the article we demonstrate that UK governments have used their constitutional 
muscle with some restraint, in part for fear of losing electoral support and legitimacy among 
their electorates. Finally, although the absence of wide-scale intergovernmental conflict in the 
face of party incongruence is consistent with the third hypothesis of the introduction, we 
argue that this is not simply the result of the devolved state alone, but also of other 
institutional features and the presence of political context in which neither the UK 
government nor the devolved governments would benefit from a path which prioritizes 
intergovernmental conflict over cooperation.  
 
Keywords:  devolution, federalism, intergovernmental relations, independence, party 
incongruence  
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1. Introduction 
 
Constitutional change has been high on the UK agenda since the election of a Labour 
government in 1997, from devolution to electoral reform, House of Lords reform and the 
constitutional recognition of civil and human rights (Evans, 2003; Hazell 2010). Not all of the 
proposed constitutional changes have taken effect. The UK Parliament is still elected under 
the first past the post system, the most advanced of the proposals for electoral reform, the 
Alternative Vote, having been rejected in a referendum in 2011. House of Lords reform has 
only been partially implemented, while the future of the Human Rights Act is uncertain under 
the current administration. Yet, one constitutional change appears to be firmly entrenched, 
i.e. the granting of self-rule to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland under ‘UK devolution’. 
In fact, self-rule for each of these three territories has deepened since the first direct election 
of the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Parliaments/Assemblies in 1999.   
 
In this article, we will first analyse to what extent devolution has transformed our 
understanding of the UK as a union-state. While in some sense devolution arguably puts the 
UK beyond the range of ‘regionalized states’, it falls short of being a federalized or 
confederal system. For one, formally speaking, UK parliamentary sovereignty remains intact, 
including the formal authority to amend the devolution acts on the basis of which Scotland 
and Wales were granted self-rule. (Northern Ireland is a little more complex). Furthermore, 
there is no guaranteed representation of the devolved administrations at the centre (either in 
the UK government or in the second chamber of Parliament) whenever it decides on issues 
that are of mutual central-devolved concern (for instance when the UK Treasury decides on 
spending allocations for the devolved governments). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
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thus far, England, with about 85% of the overall population, lacks any form of territorial self-
rule. Hence the UK government doubles up as the government of England in policies that are 
devolved to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In addition Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales all operate under distinctive self-rule arrangements, making UK devolution 
exceptionally asymmetric.   
 
This pattern of asymmetry seems set to continue. Although Welsh autonomy is moving closer 
to the current Scottish arrangement, debates in Scotland are now between the Scottish 
government’s preferred option of independence and a range of alternatives which imply a 
substantive widening of the Scottish Parliament’s current competencies, especially in 
taxation. The latter may not be on offer in the 2014 independence referendum, but few doubt 
the direction of change towards more self-government, whatever the referendum outcome. 
The highly asymmetric nature of devolution has two major consequences for the nature and 
dominant mode of interaction of IGR, and for the long term development of the constitutional 
system. We turn to both of these aspects in turn. First, as hypothesized by the general 
introduction to the special issue, an asymmetric design is conducive to bilateral and weakly 
institutionalized intergovernmental relations. Second, asymmetry, more so than the lack of 
constitutionally entrenched self-rule, makes the devolved governments vulnerable to the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Heritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). The UK government overlooks 
devolved interests when it operates as the government for England (even though externalities 
are often large due to the disproportionate size of England in the UK) and it may also at times 
neglect devolved interests when acting as the UK government (because the devolved 
governments have limited shared rule at the centre).  
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In addition, we may expect that the shadow of hierarchy is likely to become most visible 
when the UK and the devolved governments are led by different political parties. Under such 
conditions of party political incongruence, differences of opinion between the centre and the 
devolved governments may be aired more openly since they can no longer be settled within 
the same party organizational structure. Government are thus more dependent upon 
intergovernmental channels in areas of policy interdependence, policy overspill and resource 
dependence. The limitations of a hierarchical intergovernmental structure are then more 
exposed. Conversely, during periods of party congruence in the composition of government, 
close links between political parties can contain differences, facilitate mutual agreement and 
co-ordination, and help to resolve disputes. As Table 1 below demonstrates, party political 
incongruence has become a more widespread feature of devolution since the devolved 
elections of 2007, and especially since the Westminster general election of 2010, which 
resulted in full incongruence in the composition of multi-level government across the UK.   
 
 
Table 1: Government Formation since Devolution, 1999-2012 
 
 Westminster Scotland Wales Northern Ireland** 
1999-2003 Labour majority Lab-Lib Dem 
Majority 
Lab minority 
(- Oct. 2000) 
Lab-Lib Dem 
majority 
Cross-party consociational 
govt, led by UUP 
& SDLP (-2002) 
2003-2007 Labour majority Lab-Lib Dem 
Majority 
Lab ‘majority’ 
(-2005)*;  
Labour minority 
(2005-2007) 
Suspension of 
devolution 
2007-2011 Labour majority 
(-2010) 
Cons-Lib Dem 
majority 
SNP minority Lab-Plaid 
Cymru 
majority 
Cross-party consociational 
govt, led by DUP 
& Sinn Féin 
2011-present Cons-Lib Dem 
majority 
SNP majority Labour 
Minority* 
Cross-party consociational 
govt, led by DUP 
& Sinn Féin 
* Labour won exactly half of the Assembly’s 60 seats in 2003, but an opposition AM was elected to the position of 
Presiding Officer, thus giving them a nominal majority of 1. This ended when Peter Law, the AM for Blaenau Gwent, 
defected from Labour to become an Independent, in protest against the imposition of all-women shortlists for 
candidacies for the 2005 General Election. Labour again won half of the seats in 2011, falling just short of an overall 
majority. This was effectively reduced by 1 when a Labour Assembly Member was elected to the post of Presiding 
Officer. 
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** The Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended between February and May 2000; 24-hour suspensions in August 
2001 and September 2001; and from October 2002. A transitional assembly was set up in October 2006, paving the 
way for the restoration of devolution in 2007 (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2011 
http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/io/summary/new_summary.htm#7) 
Source: adapted from McEwen, et al., 2012: 190.  
 
 
However, both the hierarchical features of the UK’s multi-level system, and the asymmetric 
constitutional structure, may limit the extent to which party political incongruence provokes a 
radical transformation in multi-level dynamics. In the final section of our paper we assess 
whether - as hypothesized in the introduction to this volume - the effect of party political 
incongruence on the dynamics of intergovernmental relations remained limited as a result of 
the UK’s non-federal setting even when devolved self-rule is exercised solely by a nationalist 
party which seeks independence from the UK, as has been the case in Scotland since 2007.     
 
 
 
2. Neither federal, nor unitary: the UK’s evolution from a union to a devolved state  
 
Although the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the National Assembly 
for Wales were not established until 1999, it would be wrong to presume that the UK prior to 
1999 was a wholly unitary state. The United Kingdom was, and remains, a union, or more 
accurately perhaps, a ‘state of unions’ (Mitchell, 2009) between England and the other 
constituent nations of the UK. Each of these unions has its own characteristics. Their 
establishment was not a partnership between equals. Wales was unilaterally incorporated into 
England under Henry VIII in 1536. Scotland on the other hand forged a union of crowns in 
1603 (under King James VI) with England and a treaty of political union in 1707. The Treaty 
led to the merger of the parliaments of England and Scotland into the government and 
parliament of Great Britain, becoming the United Kingdom parliament after union with 
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Ireland in 1800. After the secession of Ireland from the UK in 1921, the six counties that 
form Northern Ireland remained with the United Kingdom (McLean and McMillan, 2005: 2).  
 
The piecemeal emergence of the UK was captured well by Rokkan and Urwin (1982: 11) 
who referred to the UK as a union state that is:  
 
not the result of straightforward dynastic conquest. Incorporation of at least parts of its 
territory has been achieved through personal dynastic union, for example by treaty, 
marriage or inheritance. Integration is less than perfect. While administrative 
standardization prevails over most of the territory, the consequences of personal union 
entail the survival in some areas of pre-union rights and institutional infrastructures which 
preserve some degree of regional autonomy.   
 
That survival of ‘pre-union rights and institutional infrastructures’ which Rokkan and Urwin 
allude to was clearest in the case of Scotland, which held on to its distinctive church, legal 
and educational system after 1707. A system of territorial administration (the Scottish Office) 
developed from the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, often in 
response to pressure for greater Scottish ‘home rule’. The Scottish Office was headed by a 
Secretary of State for Scotland who assumed symbolic significance as Scotland’s 
representative in central government (Mitchell 2009: 19, see also Mitchell 2003). Such ‘rights 
and infrastructures’ were much weaker in the case of Wales, due to the more strongly 
assimilationist character of its incorporation into the United Kingdom. It was not until 1964, 
following a strong local campaign, that similar administrative and ministerial offices were 
created for Wales. The Welsh Office and Secretary of State for Wales had a more limited 
portfolio than their Scottish counterparts. The distinctiveness of civil society was also 
weaker, and in contrast to Scotland, Wales lacked a distinctive legal jurisdiction (Bogdanor, 
1979; Bradbury, 1998). The union between England and Ireland had more closely resembled 
a colonial relationship, and the issue of home rule frequently dominated UK parliamentary 
politics from the late 19th century. Following the partition of Ireland in 1921 in the wake of 
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the Irish war of independence, an extensive system of devolved government within the UK 
prevailed in the north, surviving until its suspension in 1972 amid violent sectarian conflict 
(McLean and McMillan 2005; Ruane and Todd, 1996; Tonge, 2002). During the ensuing 
period of mainly ‘direct rule’, the Northern Ireland office - largely modelled on the other 
territorial Whitehall ministries – had administrative responsibility for those domestic policy 
areas which had previously been devolved. 
The factors that led to the transformation of this union state into a devolved state have 
been analysed in greater depth elsewhere and need not concern us here (for broad 
comparative overviews see Bogdanor 1999; Keating 2001; 2009; Mitchell 2009; Jeffery 
2011). However, the working of the UK as a ‘union-state’ prior to devolution has shaped the 
nature of the devolved ‘settlements’ that came into force in 1999, as well as the character of 
intergovernmental relations in the UK, in at least three distinctive ways.  
 
Firstly, the asymmetry that was a hallmark of separate administrative and representational 
arrangements in the pre-devolution era shaped the nature of UK devolution. Different levels 
of self-rule apply to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and at least at the point of 
‘departure’ in 1999, the policy areas in which self-rule emerged were broadly congruent with 
the areas that had previously been the responsibility of the territorial offices. Scotland 
received extensive legislative and administrative autonomy in all areas not expressly reserved 
to the Westminster parliament. As such, the Scottish Parliament enjoyed autonomy over a 
wide range of policy areas, including expenditure heavy arenas such as health and education. 
Devolution in Northern Ireland was more extensive in some respects, including more policy 
competence, for example, over social security and energy, and a separately organised civil 
service (albeit that the Northern Irish Civil Service closely resembles its UK cousin in its 
non-partisan ethos, career structure, pay and grading arrangements [Parry 2012: 294]). The 
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more politically sensitive fields of policing and justice, however, were not devolved until 
2010. In addition, Northern Irish autonomy has to be exercised within a compulsory power-
sharing (consociational) arrangement between nationalists and unionists. The form of 
devolution granted to Wales was markedly weaker. From the outset, the National Assembly 
for Wales lacked new law-making powers; Welsh primary legislation still had to be routed 
through Westminster. Devolution has been gradually deepened in Wales since 1999, and 
following the referendum in 2011, the Assembly can now pass laws in 20 designated broad 
fields, without the need for Westminster approval. Last, but not least, as there never had been 
an ‘England Office’ to separately administer government in England, England remained 
without self-rule altogether. Devolution has thus not only maintained the UK’s asymmetry, 
but reinforced it.  
 
Secondly, most observers agree that neither the union state, nor the devolved state which 
succeeded it, is federal, but some note that it posseses some federal features (Watts 1998; 
Swenden, 2006; Tierney 2008; Keating 2012; for a summary of the debate, see McLean and 
McMillan, 2005: 7-9). In strictly legal terms, UK parliamentary sovereignty remains intact. 
The devolved powers are not constitutionally entrenched. Unlike in a federation, the new UK 
Supreme Court cannot test the legality of UK parliamentary acts with the Acts granting self-
rule to the devolved territories, but it can test the compliance of devolved legislation with 
these Acts (Hazell 2006; Trench 2012). On the other hand, self-rule to the devolved territories 
was subject to a popular referendum, and by convention the UK Parliament does not amend 
the Acts on the basis of which devolution was granted without the approval of a concurrent 
majority in the affected devolved legislature. The repeated suspension of devolution to 
Northern Ireland between 1999 and 2006 is no real exception to this rule insofar as it carried 
the consent of the Northern Irish government and parliament which failed to put the 
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consociational requirements of the Good Friday Agreement into practice. Moreover, the 1998 
Good Friday Agreementi - which paved the way for devolution to Northern Ireland - 
explicitly recognised that sovereignty over Northern Ireland would be shared with the Irish 
Republic. On constitutional issues, it noted that: 
 
it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts 
respectively and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, 
to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be 
achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland (Good Friday Agreement, s.2, para. 1.ii) 
 
 
The UK is less ambiguously not federal in another regard: the absence of shared rule. 
Following devolution, the territorial offices were ‘downgraded’ in size and political 
importance, reflecting the transfer of power from the Westminster parliament and 
government to the devolved legislatures and administrations. These ‘home-grown’ 
governments could claim to speak for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland more than the 
territorial offices ever could, and the latter lost status in Whitehall as a result. Although they 
could occasional facilitate intergovernmental liaison between Whitehall and the devolved 
administrations, the latters’ preference from the outset was for direct negotiation with the 
non-territorial Whitehall departments. However, a genuine ‘shared rule’ dimension, which 
would systematically involve devolved administrations in core central decisions affecting 
devolved interests, is largely missing from the UK framework of devolution. Shared rule is a 
core feature of federal systems (Elazar 1988; see also Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2008). In 
fact, in the UK increased self-rule has arguably been accompanied by a reduction in shared 
rule. The same route might not have been taken had there been a concurrent transfer of 
competencies to an English Parliament or a set of English legislatures, similar to the process 
underpinning the regionalization of Spain (see the contribution by Colino et.al. in this 
volume). Arguably, the combination of de facto entrenched self-rule affecting a limited 
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proportion of its population with a limited degree of shared rule puts the UK devolved 
territories in a position that is not too dissimilar from that of federacies.  
 
Thirdly, relations between the territories of the UK in the pre-devolution era were not absent, 
but they took the form of ‘intra-governmental relations’ between the Cabinet Office, other 
Whitehall departments and the territorial offices of state. The ‘concordats’ governing this 
information exchange between the territorial and functional Whitehall departments served as 
a template for the intergovernmental (vertical) coordination mechanisms between Whitehall 
and the devolved administrations since 1999. Hence, the post-devolution concordats, the 
Memorandum of Understanding, and Devolution Guidance Notes can be understood as ‘path-
dependent’ instruments for intergovernmental coordination. As such, they applied the process 
of information exchange, representation and co-operation which existed between the 
territorial offices and the relevant functional departments in Whitehall prior to devolution to 
the relationship between the latter and the devolved administrations after 1999 (Poirier 2001: 
150).   
 
3. Nature of Intergovernmental Machinery and Modes of Coordination   
Modes of intergovernmental coordination concern the processes and practice of how relations 
are conducted between central and sub-unit governments. Bolleyer, et al. (introduction, this 
volume) hypothesised that the constitutionally weaker position of units in regionalized 
systems lend themselves more readily to bilateral modes of intergovernmental co-ordination. 
Multilateral intergovernmental co-ordination may be further inhibited where the structure of 
regionalised government is asymmetric. We might expect, then, that the UK’s highly 
asymmetric and non-federal structure would not be conducive to the emergence of a strong 
multilateral intergovernmental framework.  
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The Machinery of IGR 
Multilateral coordination bodies are not entirely absent from UK IGR. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), which underpins relations between the UK and devolved 
governments, made provision for a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). The JMC was to 
meet annually in plenary format, bringing together the UK Prime Minister, Deputy Prime 
Minister, the Secretaries of State in the territorial offices and First Ministers of the devolved 
territories. More regular JMC meetings were anticipated in functional formats bringing 
together the relevant UK and devolved ministers holding a particular policy portfolio. In the 
early years of devolution, however, JMC meetings had little significance and largely fell into 
disuse. Prior to 2007, the JMC met only three times in plenary format and functional sessions 
(for instance on health, or the knowledge economy) were convened very infrequently (Trench 
2004: 514; Trench 2007: 167). One functional format – the JMC (Europe) - was an exception 
to this rule. It had its origins in a pre-devolution interdepartmental committee whose goal was 
to formulate the UK’s negotiating line vis-à-vis the EU. Under devolution, relations with the 
EU (which are classed as foreign policy) are a competence of the Westminster institutions, 
but since many Europeanized competences impinge upon devolved policies (e.g. agriculture 
and fisheries, environment), the need to coordinate the UK position in advance of meetings of 
the Council of the EU remains evident (MacPhail 2008). 
 
Aside from the JMC (Europe), the formal process of intergovernmental diplomacy may have 
been little used. However, even during the early years, inter-ministerial meetings did 
sometimes take place outside of the formal JMC framework. For example, agricultural 
ministers met regularly, especially at times of crisis (e.g. during the outbreak of Foot and 
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Mouth Disease). The so-called ‘Finance Quadrilaterals’ continue to bring together finance 
ministers from the devolved governments with Treasury ministers (Gallagher, 2012: 201).  
Following the emergence of greater party incongruence after 2007, and pressure from the 
newly elected devolved administrations, the mode of intergovernmental relations became 
moderately more institutionalised, with more use of formal multilateral fora. In addition to a 
continuation of the Joint Ministerial Committee in its European format, plenary JMCs have 
been convened annually since 2008, usually chaired by the Prime Minister, and a new JMC 
(Domestic), usually chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, has been meeting twice a year to 
discuss non-EU issues.  
A final multilateral body is the British-Irish Council (BIC) which surpasses the scope of 
the UK-state, but nonetheless brings all the devolved and UK actors together. Apart from the 
UK, Welsh, Northern Irish and Scottish governments, the Council is made up of government 
representatives of Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey). At 
the summit level (heads of government) it meets annually, but it also convenes at lower levels 
(ministerial or sectoral and administrative). Although it grew out of the Good Friday 
Agreement, the BIC continued its operation even when devolution to Northern Ireland was 
suspended for most of the time between 2002 and 2007 (Birrell, 2012: 277). It is less 
hierarchical than the Joint Ministerial Committee - meetings are chaired by the host 
government, not necessarily by the UK government - and is developing a broad portfolio, but 
it remains mainly a symbol of co-operation and communication rather than co-decision.     
 
Although multilateral bodies have developed to manage some intergovernmental business, 
they are eclipsed in importance and frequency by bilateral meetings at the ministerial and 
administrative level. Notwithstanding their infrequent, ad hoc get togethers, for example, 
within the co-called ‘Celtic forum’, the asymmetric distribution of competences, coupled 
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with the distinctive political systems and institutions in each case, mean that the devolved 
administrations rarely share common interests that would drive a structure of multi-lateral co-
ordination on a horizontal basis. Bilateral UK-Scottish, UK-Welsh or UK-Northern Irish 
intergovernmental relations are by far the most prevalent mode of co-ordination between the 
devolved administrations and the UK government. In presenting evidence to an enquiry into 
Devolution to the House of Commons Justice Committee in 2008, Jack McConnell, Scottish 
First Minister between 2001 and 2007, defended the prevalence of such bilateral relations in 
the following terms:  
 
one of the reasons why the JMCs were effectively, in terms of meetings, abandoned by 
agreement between myself and the [UK] Prime Minister, was that we wanted to create 
much stronger relationships, bilateral relationships between the individual departments in 
devolved Scotland and the individual departments of Whitehall, and it was certainly the 
case between 2003 and 2007, that the relationship between my Justice Minister and the 
[UK] Home Secretary or between our Transport Minister and the [UK] Transport 
Secretary and so on, were significantly stronger and far, far more productive than they 
would have been if we had continued to have an amorphous discussion through JMCs or 
deal with everything simply through a Secretary of State for Scotland (HCJC, 22 April 
2008).  
 
However, given the asymmetry inherent in UK devolution, the frequency of these bilateral 
UK-devolved meetings differs, depending on which devolved territory is involved. All 
devolved governments engage in intergovernmental relations – for example, to integrate 
policies where necessary, confront policy interdependencies, settle cross-border issues or 
alleviate conflicts of interest resulting from policy – but the relatively dual blueprint of 
devolution in Scotland and (when not suspended) Northern Ireland may reduce the need for 
frequent high level intergovernmental coordination. By contrast, the highly co-operative 
design of the Welsh devolution settlement necessitated intense bilateral intergovernmental 
contact. The Government of Wales Act (1998) entrusted Wales with the power to make 
delegated legislation within the framework of existing primary legislation passed at 
Westminster. Through TFOs (Transfer of Function Orders), the UK Secretary of State for 
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Wales and the Welsh Affairs Select Committee of the UK Parliament could transfer 
executive functions and subordinate legislation to the National Assembly. Therefore, and 
unlike in Scotland and Northern Ireland, from the outset the Welsh settlement generated a 
context in which close collaboration between the Welsh Office, the Secretary of State for 
Wales, Welsh MPs and Welsh Members of the Assembly (AMs) was mandatory for the 
system to work. The Government of Wales Act (2006) increased the level of autonomy of the 
Welsh Assembly, but it did not remove the need for intense bilateral co-operation. The Act 
gave the National Assembly of Wales the right to pass primary legislation, but this still 
required the prior consent of the UK government and/or parliament. Under a so-called 
intergovernmental (or bottom up) route, the Welsh National Assembly had to initiate 
Legislative Competence Orders (LCO), requesting Westminster to delegate power to the 
Assembly so that it could take ‘measures’ in ‘matters’ within the twenty designated policy 
fields. This route was intergovernmental because an LCO had to be passed to the Secretary of 
State for Wales prior to being sent to Parliament. The second, inter-parliamentary route  
allowed the UK Parliament, through a parliamentary act, to delegate legislative powers to the 
National Assembly for Wales and by doing so to insert a particular matter into the list of 
policy fields. Thus, the devolved institutions in Wales were institutionally highly dependent 
upon Westminster and the Welsh Office for the exercise of their law-making powers. 
 
Co-operation or Conflict? 
Intergovernmental relations in the UK are hierarchical. Not only does constitutional 
supremacy rest with the Westminster parliament, but the Westminster government also 
retains significant reserved powers which can impinge upon devolved competence, and 
crucially, it is the source for most of the devolved governments’ revenue. Although this 
comes in the form of a formula-driven, and thus non-negotiable, unconditional transfer, 
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intergovernmental tensions can emerge over the implementation of this formula as well as 
over what Trench referred to as ‘second order issues’ concerning the means by which the 
devolved administrations might access additional resources from the Treasury (Trench 2008: 
81). 
In the first eight years of Scottish and Welsh devolution (devolution was suspended 
during much of this time in Northern Ireland) IGR were broadly co-operative. Few 
intergovernmental disputes emerged either bilaterally or within multi-lateral forums. The 
Joint Ministerial Committee did not even devise a dispute resolution mechanism, let alone 
meet to resolve disputes, until 2010. It would be reasonable to assume that co-operative IGR 
was facilitated by the prevalence of the Labour Party in government across mainland Britain 
from 1999-2007. Whether in Westminster or the devolved arenas, the Labour Party broadly 
shared policy and political agendas, minimising the likelihood of conflict emerging, while 
personal links and friendships helped to ensure mutual trust, and facilitate inter-ministerial 
negotiation and compromise when necessary. 
Conflict was not entirely absent during this period, however. For example, the UK Labour 
government showed its discomfort whenever the Scottish Executive seemed to outflank it on 
public service provision, for example, in abolishing up-front tuition fees, introducing free 
personal care for the elderly, or offering a more generous compensation scheme to Scottish 
victims accidentally contracting the Hepatitis C virus after receiving contaminated blood 
(Cairney, 2006). But however contested these issues may have been, the Scottish Executive 
was never prevented from proceeding with its own policy, and agreements were found behind 
closed doors where necessary.  
Similarly, the UK government did not prevent the National Assembly for Wales 
introducing free prescription charges, free breakfasts in primary schools, free entry to 
museums and galleries and bus travel for 16 to 18 year olds at reduced rates – all of which 
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deviated from the UK Labour government’s policies for England. This is especially notable 
in the Welsh case given the institutional dependence of Welsh devolution, and the rhetoric 
with which such policies were pursued. The Welsh Labour First Minister, Rhodri Morgan, 
underlined his government’s intention to draw ‘clear red water’ between its agenda and the 
‘New Labour’ agenda of the UK government (BBC, 11 Dec 2002), although this rhetoric was 
arguably aimed more at appealing to the Welsh electorate than irritating ministerial 
colleagues at Westminster.  
The institutional dependence of the Welsh institutions on the UK government and 
parliament did create some tensions and frustration, even during periods of predominant party 
congruence. For such dependence to be manageable, it would have required shared rule 
mechanisms to ensure the preferences of the devolved institutions could be conveyed within 
the central authorities. Yet, as noted above, such mechanisms were largely absent. A House 
of Lords report on inter-institutional relations lamented liaison over legislation as 
‘unsystematic, almost random, highly opaque… with limited opportunities for the National 
Assembly’s views to be heard in connection with bills affecting the assembly’ (House of 
Lords, 2002: 36; see also AWCR 2009). The 2006 Government of Wales Act, discussed 
above, exacerbated the problem by giving effective veto powers to Welsh MPs in scrutinising 
legislative orders emanating from the National Assembly. The Presiding Officer of the 
National Assembly for Wales reportedly wrote to the Secretary of State for Wales to 
complain about the obstructionist approach and ‘anti-devolution sentiments’ of the Welsh 
Affairs Select Committee (a majority of whose MPs were then from the Labour Party) when 
considering and scrutinising these legislative orders (Chaney, 2009). Difficulties were 
aggravated by tensions and power struggles within the Wales Labour Party, between those 
representing the party in the Assembly and (some) Labour Westminster MPs.  The Welsh-UK 
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bilateral relationship was thus not only more unequal than the Scottish-UK relationship, but 
also somewhat more fractious. 
Predominant party congruence in the political composition of the UK’s governments gave 
way to a gradual increase in party incongruence after 2007, most notably in Scotland in the 
wake of the SNP’s election victory, followed by total incongruence after the election of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in 2010. This was accompanied by deterioration in 
intergovernmental relations, but the extent to which this occurred should not be exaggerated. 
The new Westminster government entered office with the promise of respecting the authority 
of the devolved administrations – the so-called ‘respect agenda’. However, Wyn Jones and 
Royles (2012: 263-4) noted a ‘marked deterioriation’ in the Welsh-UK intergovernmental 
relationship since 2010, with (Labour) Welsh ministers more assertive and critical of their 
Westminster counterparts, especially on issue of finance and public expenditure cuts. The 
SNP-led Scottish government also adopted a more assertive strategy in IGR, seeking to reap 
the political benefits of ‘standing up for Scotland’, but by and large, they played by the rules. 
Hence, when negotiating with the UK government on a UK position in Europe, the SNP 
agreed not to disclose to anyone, not even the Scottish Parliament, what disagreements they 
may have had with the UK government over the formulation of its policy (Cairney, 2012: 
237). Doing so would have put at risk the access the Scottish government has to Whitehall, 
which under UK devolution arrangements is a privilege not a constitutional right. Moreover, 
all of the devolved administrations, to varying degrees, rely upon the policy capacity of 
Whitehall. The divergences in policy which often accompany party incongruence have 
created some strains in relationships between UK ministers and their Scottish and Welsh 
counterparts especially since 2010, but the effect should not be exaggerated and inter-
personal relationships matter too; according to officials (interview), a change of minister can 
have as much if not more impact than a change of government.  
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The asymmetry in the power relationship between the UK and Scottish government is at 
least one of the factors contributing to the continuation of relatively smooth 
intergovernmental relationships even in the context of party incongruence. However, several 
institutional features also play a role here. The relatively dual framework of the distribution 
of powers (keeping the need for intense bilateral negotiations to a minimum), UK political 
culture (which favours political mediation over judicial litigation) and the gluing force of the 
unified Home Civil Service (which provides senior civil servants in Scotland with access to 
their counterparts in Whitehall departments) have also played their part in keeping the UK-
Scottish bilateral relationships on an amicable footing (for further analysis of the effects of 
these features on UK IGR, see McEwen et al., 2012). The SNP’s minority status in 
government between 2007 and 2011 may also have contributed, preventing them from 
making progress on some issues – the independence debate chief among them - which may 
have posed difficult intergovernmental challenges. The SNP government’s majority status 
since 2011 poses no such barriers, as discussed below.  
2007 also marked the resurrection of devolution in Northern Ireland. Its distinctive party 
system and concosiational arrangements mean that UK-Northern Ireland relations are 
conducted within a context of permanent party political incongruence. The relaunch of 
devolution in Northern Ireland coincided with a polarisation of politics, with the two most 
radical parties within the unionist and nationalist camp – the Democratic and Unionist Party 
and Sinn Féin – emerging as the largest parties, assuming the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister roles. This might have created added challenges in relations with the UK 
government before and after 2010; both the Conservatives and the Labour Party have 
stronger links with their more moderate rivals. It should be noted, however, that while 
Northern Irish-UK IGR are conducted on a similar informal and hierarchical basis to IGR 
elsewhere in the UK, Northern Ireland is unique in also being engaged in more formal north-
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south intergovernmental arrangements with the Republic of Ireland. A notable feature of 
intergovernmental relations in Northern Ireland has been the preference for unionist ministers 
to engage in bilateral contacts with their UK counterparts, while nationalist ministers are 
more keen to engage directly with the Irish government (Birrell, 2012: 275).  
As a former official once intimately involved with the process of intergovernmental 
relations noted, such relations and disputes are often about the money (Gallagher, 2012: 206). 
Indeed, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of party congruence and incongruence for the 
prevailing budgetary climate. Party congruence coincided with very favourable fiscal 
transfers to the devolved administrations. Party incongruence, meanwhile, has emerged amid 
a changed fiscal environment, emanating from the economic downturn and the deficit and 
debt reducing priorities of the UK government elected in 2010. The latter’s deficit-reduction 
agenda has placed a strain on relations between the UK government and all of the devolved 
administrations. UK public expenditure cuts have considerable repercussions for the 
devolved governments, given the existing mechanisms for funding devolution. Cuts imposed 
on programmes which affect only England have a direct consequence on the size of the fiscal 
transfers to the devolved administrations. 
In this new fiscal environment, the devolved governments have appeared more willing to 
work together to oppose the UK government, as was seen in their joint declaration calling on 
the government to scale back its planned public expenditure cuts in the devolved territories. 
Working within the Joint Ministerial Committee, they also invoked the aforementioned 
protocol on dispute resolution in a grievance about the categorisation of spending on 
transport and regeneration in preparation for the 2012 Olympic Games. Because this 
spending was classed as outside of the usual financial framework, it did not automatically 
lead to additional funding for the devolved administrations (via the Barnett formula), 
prompting delicate negotiations between officials from the different administrations which 
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eventually led to inter-ministerial agreement. Nonetheless, asymmetry ensures that there 
remain few issues around which the devolved administrations can find common cause, and 
bilateral intergovernmental relationships remain the order of the day.  
   
 
4. Long term Evolution of the Multi-Level System 
 
The asymmetric features underpinning the mode of intergovernmental coordination also feed 
into the long term evolution of the multi-level system. In the introduction, it was 
hypothesised that sub-units whose status is constitutionally equal are also keen to be treated 
equally, generating symmetry of competence allocation in the long run. On the other hand, 
sub-units which lack equality of status will try to use whatever resources they have to get the 
most out of the centre, implying the long term perpetuation of asymmetry. We find 
confirmation for this hypothesis in the UK case.  
 
Scotland: from devolution to independence?  
Of the three devolved territories, Scotland is the strongest in terms of its resource strength: it 
has the largest population; it is the wealthiest in terms of per capita Gross Value Added 
(which is close to that of England even without reference to the revenues which flow from the 
North Sea [ONS, 2012]); it is abundant with natural resources (oil, gas and renewables); and 
it has distinctive policy communities in education, health and the legal system which long 
pre-date devolution but have been strengthened by it. Furthermore, most Scottish citizens 
strongly identify with the Scottish nation, more readily so than with Britain. This is also 
reflected in the distinctive nature of the Scottish party system, in which since the late 1980s, 
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the Conservatives have become a marginal player and Labour and the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) have been locked into an intense struggle for power.  
During the first eight years of devolution, the Labour Party dominated both Westminster 
politics and led a coalition government (with the Liberal Democrats) in Scotland. As the 
party that introduced devolution, the priority for government north and south of the border 
was to make devolution work. For the most part, this meant working within the existing 
constitutional settlement, though through bilateral negotiations with the UK government, the 
Scottish Executive (as government was then called) obtained a transfer of executive functions 
from the UK Department of Transport in railway policy (except for safety matters and the 
licensing of railway operators). By contrast, the SNP’s central objective is to maximise and 
extend Scottish self-government and, ultimately, secure a future for Scotland as an 
independent state. The creation of the Scottish Parliament provided the SNP with an 
institutional platform on which it could more easily channel its demands for Scottish self-
government and independence even in opposition. In government, the party kick-started a 
new process of constitutional reform. This has already led to a re-allocation of powers from 
Westminster to the Scottish Parliament (see Scotland Act [2012]), and at time of writing, we 
await the outcome of a referendum on Scottish independence, to be held in autumn 2014.  
Following the SNP’s victory in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections, the party in 
government launched a ‘National Conversation’ on Scotland’s constitutional future. In 
response, the opposition parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats and Conservatives), backed by 
the UK party leaders and the UK Labour government, set up a commission to review the 
1998 settlement. The commission’s main recommendations, which focused on enhancing the 
fiscal accountability and autonomy of the parliament, were largely reflected in the 2012 
Scotland Act, which represented a moderate strengthening of the original devolution 
settlement. The debate, however, has already moved on in the wake of the SNP’s convincing 
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victory in the 2011 Scottish elections. In addition to the SNP’s platform of independence, 
organisations within civil society and some politicians have championed a variety of forms of 
enhanced devolution which would lead to a further re-allocation of competences. 
Although the constitution is a reserved matter under the 1998 Scotland Act and the UK 
parliament has explicit sovereignty on these issues, in practice, the UK government has 
committed to not altering the devolution settlement without the express consent of the 
Scottish Parliament. The UK government also recognised that the SNP’s election victory in 
2011 gave the latter a legitimate mandate to hold a referendum on independence. While 
stressing its belief that independence would not be in the best interests of Scotland or the rest 
of the UK, a joint statement by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister noted: ‘we will 
not stand in the way of a referendum on independence: the future of Scotland’s place within 
the United Kingdom is for people in Scotland to vote on.’ (Scotland Office, 2012: 5). Yet, 
they also insisted that it be ‘legal, fair and decisive’, and agreed a temporary transfer of 
legislative competence to the Scottish Parliament to put any referendum legislation beyond 
legal challenge. This was not unconditional. In the eyes of the UK government, a ‘legal, fair 
and decisive’ referendum meant ‘a single, straightforward question’, clear rules and 
independent oversight. In effect, this meant that the Scottish Government could not pursue 
the option of holding a two question referendum, including enhanced devolution on the ballot 
paper.  
Although the long term constitutional trajectory of Scotland and the bilateral way in 
which it is pursued is in line with the ‘regionalized’ scenario, the UK tolerance for a Scottish 
referendum on the issue is not. In Spain, both the Constitutional Court and the PSOE central 
government prevented the Basque Country from holding a referendum on the issue in 
October 2008, and the government of the Partido Popular appear similarly intransigent in the 
face of Catalan demands for a referendum. Even in strongly decentralized federal Canada, the 
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federal government’s reference to the Supreme Court, made in the wake of the narrowly 
defeated referendum on Quebec sovereignty in 1995, sought to limit the capacity of Quebec 
to secede from the federation. The pragmatic approach of the UK government may of course 
partly reflect its confidence (based on polling) that an independence referendum will be 
defeated. It is notable, however, that the agreement on the transfer of legislative competence - 
dubbed ‘the Edinburgh Agreement’ - committed the two governments, in spirit if not in law, 
to respect the outcome of the referendum whatever it may be, and work co-operatively in so 
doing (HM government/Scottish government, 2012). 
 
Wales: from administrative autonomy to legislative devolution 
In the wake of the 2003 elections, the then Welsh First Minister Rhodri Morgan’s popularity 
among Welsh Labour party members, grassroots and the electorate gave him the political 
legitimacy and strength to force a profound review of the Welsh devolution settlement under 
the Government of Wales Act (1998, revised in 2006). Despite representing the Labour Party, 
Morgan advocated a neo-nationalist’ (Keating 2009) agenda. Welsh Assembly secretaries 
were renamed as ministers and referred to themselves as the Welsh Assembly Government as 
early as 2000 and 2002 respectively, heightening the similarity with a conventional 
government. (Paradoxically, the Scottish Executive did not call itself a government until 
2007). The revised Government of Wales Act formally and legally separated the National 
Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Assembly Government, and also entrusted the former 
with the potential of legislative powers. 
The Welsh elections in 2007, after which the Government of Wales Act entered into 
force, also produced a coalition government between the two largest parties, Labour and 
Plaid Cymru, a nationalist party which campaigns for Welsh self-government. The coalition 
agreement ensured the establishment of an ‘All Wales Convention’ with a view to preparing a 
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referendum on full legislative Assembly powers. Simultaneously a commission was 
established to consider tax-raising powers for the Welsh assembly. The decision to hold a 
referendum, unanimously supported by the National Assembly for Wales, was recognised by 
the incoming UK government elected in 2010, in spite of the Conservatives earlier 
reservations on primary legislative powers for Wales. The referendum produced a 
comfortable majority in favour of law-making powers - 63.5% voted ‘Yes’, albeit on a 
turnout of just 35.6% (see Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012) – leading to a transfer of legislative 
autonomy in 20 broad fields over which the Assembly government had enjoyed executive 
competence since 1999, including education, health care, housing, transport, agriculture, 
environment and culture. The process of constitutional reform is ongoing in Wales. In 
October 2011, the UK Secretary of State for Wales agreed to set up a commission (commonly 
known as the ‘Silk Commission’ named after its chairman Paul Silk). It serves a double 
purpose: to examine whether and how to strengthen the National Assembly’s fiscal autonomy 
(including borrowing powers); and to review the powers of the National Assembly for Wales 
‘in the light of experience’, making recommendations for a further re-allocation of 
competences.  
These seemingly parallel processes in Scotland and Wales in fact have very little cross-
over. Developments in Scotland are noted in Wales and do influence the nature of the debate. 
Changes to the Scottish constitutional settlement could have indirect implications for Wales’ 
position within the Union, and especially its capacity to access and influence the UK 
government in the intergovernmental arena. Campaigners for change have sought to place 
Welsh devolution on an equal footing with Scottish devolution. In this respect, the process of 
constitutional reform resembles the dynamic – captured by the phrase café para todos - 
observed by scholars of Spanish territorial politics, where constitutionally weaker 
autonomous communities have sought to catch up with the leading historic nations by gaining 
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greater competences, thus diminishing asymmetry (Giordano and Roller, 2004). But it is not 
quite a case of ‘tea for everyone’ in the UK. Developments in Wales go largely unnoticed in 
Scotland, where the debate over constitutional change is predominantly an internal one with 
its own dynamic. Meanwhile, the brief flirtation with a weak form of administrative 
regionalism in England has passed, and there is little prospect of elected devolved assemblies 
either within the English regions or for England as a whole. English regional devolution has 
been overtaken by a centrally-driven cities agenda, generating a piecemeal and asymmetric 
system of directly elected mayors in some parts of England. Asymmetry, it seems, is set to 
continue.  
 
Northern Ireland: Making power-sharing work  
In some sense, the Northern Ireland settlement has been the least subject to change. The 
priority, instead, has been to solidify the peace process by ensuring that parliamentary politics 
replace the extra-parliamentary and paramilitary activity that dominated Northern Ireland in 
the period of ‘Direct Rule’. Following the suspensions that beset the early years of 
devolution, that the Assembly has now been running without suspension since 2007 is a 
significant achievement. In 2010, this success was recognised in an intergovernmental 
agreement, approved by both parliaments, to transfer legislative control over criminal justice, 
the courts and policing to the Northern Ireland Assembly. This transfer of powers was always 
envisaged in the Good Friday Agreement and the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, the legal 
foundation of the devolved institutions, and was described by then Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland as the completion of the UK government’s responsibilities in the peace 
process and a means to enable the Assembly ‘to complete its arrangements for full 
devolution’ (quoted in the Guardian, 22 March 2010). Although Northern Ireland now has the 
most extensive form of devolution in the UK, whether this should be considered ‘full’ 
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devolution is open to debate. The Executive’s 2011 Programme for Government included a 
commitment to press for the devolution of corporation tax to enable a reduction in tax levels 
so as to compete on a level playing field with the Irish Republic. Intense bilateral 
intergovernmental negotiations with the UK Treasury have yet to reach agreement.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The UK conforms most closely to a regionalised system; sovereignty rests with the UK 
parliament, it is not shared with the parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales or 
Northern Ireland. Their assemblies’ powers are devolved – derived from Westminster statute. 
They are not entrenched. The UK is also profoundly asymmetric, more so than even other 
regionalised states. ‘Regionalism’ extends only to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
geographically on the periphery of the state – the English ‘core’ is governed by a parliament 
which serves simultaneously England and the UK as a whole. As expected by the first 
hypothesis in the introduction, these institutional features go some way to explaining the 
mode of intergovernmental coordination, which is less formal than in most federal and 
confederal contexts, and more prone to bilateralism than multilateral engagement. 
Bilateralism also contributes to perpetuating and reinforcing the asymmetric logic of the UK 
devolved system in the long run, as anticipated by the second hypothesis in the introduction.  
 
UK IGR is conducted ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. In the context of any 
intergovernmental dispute, the UK government has the upper hand. It enjoys significantly 
greater policy capacity; it holds the purse strings in relations to territorial finance; it manages 
the Joint Ministerial Committees, and chairs its meetings; and it has constitutional supremacy 
over the devolved territories. Yet, this is not an entirely accurate portrayal of IGR in the UK, 
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and requires several qualifications. First, while financial resources do lie with the UK 
Treasury, the formula-driven system of territorial finance minimises (without eradicating) the 
need for negotiations to secure financial settlements. Second, although the Westminster 
parliament does retain constitutional sovereignty, successive UK governments have largely 
stuck to the convention that they will not act in the devolved arena, or reallocate 
constitutional competences, without the explicit consent of the devolved territories, expressed 
either through parliamentary approval or a referendum. Finally, UK governments have been 
reluctant to flex their constitutional muscle against the devolved nations for fear of losing 
electoral support and legitimacy among their electorates.  
Nonetheless, it might be expected that both the mode of intergovernmental coordination 
and the process of competence re-allocation might be affected by party competition. The UK, 
after all, is often characterised as one of the most adversarial systems in Europe, with intense 
rivalries between competing political parties. That competitive culture may be played out 
vertically, affecting the relations between governments when they are led by opposing 
parties. The introduction to this volume hypothesised that this effect would be felt more 
acutely in federal states, where the constitutional competences of territorial units are 
entrenched and relations less hierarchical. In regionalized states, by contrast, where the 
balance of constitutional power is tilted towards the central authority and the latter would in 
theory be in a position to withdraw competences or resources to recalcitrant territorial units 
the effect of party incongruence on intergovernmental relations may be more muted. 
In practice, in the UK, the mode of intergovernmental coordination has seen some modest 
changes since party incongruence became more prominent. Formal multilateral processes are 
used a little more frequently, and some intergovernmental tensions have emerged. 
Bilateralism still prevails, however, and thus far at least, disputes have been resolved through 
negotiation and compromise, whether over issues of territorial finance or constitutional 
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futures. We cannot conclude that this is simply a result of the UK’s structure as a regionalised 
state. There are other institutional features, most notably the culture and organisation of the 
Home Civil Service, and the absence of a politicised judiciary, which also play a part. Politics 
matters too. Neither the UK government nor the devolved governments have seen political 
benefits in a path which priorities conflict over cooperation in the intergovernmental arena. 
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i The Good Friday Agreement – also known as the Belfast Agreement – was endorsed by most of the political 
parties in Northern Ireland (excluding the Democratic Unionist Party) and incorporated an international treaty 
agreement between the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Among other matters relating to the peace process and 
the cessation of armed conflict, it set out the principles upon which devolution would work, and recognised the 
legitimacy of both the unionist desire to remain within the UK and the nationalist goal of a united Ireland.  
 
 
 
 
 
